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I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 2009, the Constitutional Court of South Africa (the ―Court‖) 
developed an innovative remedy in housing rights cases that it termed 
―engagement.‖1 In its most basic form, engagement requires municipalities to 
use negotiation or mediation when it becomes clear that the adoption of a 
new policy will require evicting residents.
2
 But the Court‘s description of 
 
 
  Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I would like to thank 
Jonathan Klaaren for first bringing the Mamba litigation to my attention, and to Jonathan, Stephen 
Ellmann, and other members of the South Africa Reading Group for raising important questions about 
the limits of engagement. Amy Burchfield and Jessica Mathewson provided excellent research and 
editing assistance. 
 1. Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of Johannesburg (Olivia Road) 2008 
(5) BCLR 475 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 2. Id.  
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engagement envisions much broader application and imposes potentially far-
reaching obligations on municipalities and other levels of government. At the 
same time, engagement offers a potentially powerful tool to civil society 
organizations active in socioeconomic rights issues.  
Since first developing engagement in Olivia Road,
3
 the Court has used the 
remedy in only a handful of cases.
4
 In one case, the Court unsuccessfully 
attempted to use engagement to resolve an urgent dispute over the timeframe 
and terms for closing camps that housed refugees of the xenophobic violence 
that wrecked South Africa in May 2008.
5
 In a second case, the Court used 
engagement to give residents some measure of control over the 
implementation
6
 of what one commentator called ―the largest judicially 
sanctioned eviction of a community in [South Africa‘s] post-apartheid 
period.‖7 These two cases, together with Olivia Road, offer important lessons 
for understanding both the untapped potential of engagement as well as its 
limits.  
This Article first analyzes the Court‘s three engagement decisions. It then 
divides engagement into two different categories—litigation engagement and 
political engagement—and offers suggestions for transforming the process 
into a more effective remedy in each category. Drawing on the work of 
Charles Epp, this Article argues that political engagement, if structured 
correctly, offers the greatest potential as an effective mechanism for 
enforcing socioeconomic rights. Realization of that potential will require a 
sustained commitment by civil society organizations active in socioeconomic 
rights issues and a shift from using engagement as a litigation tactic to using 
it as a tool for political advocacy. 
 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Mamba v. Minister of Soc. Dev. 2008, Case No. CCT 65/08 (CC) (S. Afr.); Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes (Joe Slovo) 2009 (9) BCLR 847 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
As this Article goes to press, the Court recently discussed, but did not use the remedy in one other 
case, Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement S. Afr. v. Premier of KwaZulu-Natal 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) 
(S. Afr.). A recently published report on engagement contains a useful overview and discussion of 
many of the issues this Article raises. See Lauren Royston & Kate Tissington, Workshop Report: 
Meaningful Engagement (Dec. 2009), available at http://web.wits.ac.za/NR/rdonlyres/ D1176AF9-
340B-413B-AF79-2F1152BE0CDA/0/Meaningfulengagementreport_Dec09.pdf. 
 5. Mamba, Case No. CCT 22/08, ¶¶ 1–2, 5. 
 6. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847. 
 7. Sandra J. Liebenberg, Joe Slovo Eviction: Vulnerable Community Feels the Law from the 
Top Down, BUSINESS DAY, June 22, 2009, http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/content.aspx?id= 
73812. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/2
  
 
 
 
 
2010] ENGAGEMENT‘S POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS 401 
 
 
 
 
II. THE ENGAGEMENT CASES 
A. Olivia Road: A Successful Engagement 
Olivia Road began as a series of emergency applications in the 
Witwatersrand High Court
8
 by the City of Johannesburg to evict over three 
hundred people from six properties in inner-city Johannesburg.
9
 The City 
sought these evictions as part of a broader regeneration strategy, one aspect 
of which was the identification, clearance, and ultimate redevelopment of 
over two hundred ―bad‖ buildings—with some 67,000 occupants—in the 
inner-city district.
10
  
Several civil society groups and NGOs coordinated the residents‘ 
challenge to these evictions with tremendous initial success.
11
 The High 
Court rejected the City‘s eviction application and issued a broad order 
holding that the City had violated section 26 of the Constitution, the right to 
access to adequate housing, by pursuing these evictions without a plan to 
house the evicted residents.
12
 The court also enjoined the City from seeking 
to evict the residents, and ordered it to develop a plan for housing the 
litigants and other residents, as required by Gov‟t of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, the 
court‘s first housing rights decision.13 But, on appeal, the intermediate 
appellate court, the Supreme Court of Appeal (―SCA‖), reversed the High 
Court‘s order and held that the evictions were constitutionally permissible 
and triggered only a very limited responsibility by the City to relocate the 
displaced residents.
14
 
The residents appealed the SCA‘s order to the Constitutional Court, 
which accepted the application in May 2007.
15
 The Court heard oral 
argument on August 28, 2007, and two days later issued its first 
 
 
 8. The High Court of South Africa: Witwatersrand Local Division. 
 9. City of Johannesburg v. Rand Props. (Pty) Ltd. (City of Johannesburg High Ct.) 2006, Case 
No. 04/10330, ¶ 2 (HC, Witwatersrand Local Div.) (S. Afr.). 
 10. See CTR. ON HOUS. RIGHTS & EVICTIONS, ANY ROOM FOR THE POOR? FORCED EVICTIONS IN 
JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA 41–46, 60–64 (2005), http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/Any_ 
Room_for_the_Poor_8Mar05.pdf (describing the regeneration plan and the practice of forced 
evictions) [hereinafter ANY ROOM?]. 
 11. See id. 
 12. City of Johannesburg High Ct., Case No. 04/10330, ¶ 52. 
 13. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. In Grootboom, another eviction case, the Constitutional Court held that the 
housing policies at the national, provincial, and local levels were unconstitutional because they lacked 
any plans for dealing with the emergency needs of citizens facing eviction, and required the 
government to develop plans for dealing with such situations. Gov‟t of the Rep. of S. Afr. v. 
Grootboom 2000, Case No. CCT 11/00 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 14. City of Johannesburg v. Rand Props. (Pty) Ltd. 2007 SCA 25 (SCA) (S. Afr.). 
 15. See Interim Order dated 30 Aug. 2007, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City 
of Johannesburg 2007, Case No. CCT 24/07 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
402 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 9:399 
 
 
 
 
―engagement‖ order requiring the parties to ―engage with each other 
meaningfully . . . in an effort to resolve the differences and difficulties aired 
in this application in the light of the values of the Constitution, the 
constitutional and statutory duties of the municipality and the rights and 
duties of the citizens concerned.‖16 The Court also ordered the parties to file 
affidavits with the Court approximately one month later, reporting the results 
of the negotiations.
17
  
After engaging over several months, the parties eventually reached a 
partial settlement that largely granted the residents the terms they had sought 
and won at the High Court, and also incorporated provisions for broader 
change in the City‘s inner-city housing policy.18 Among other things, the 
City agreed to cease its eviction attempts and to take specific measures to 
make the existing buildings safer and more habitable by cleaning the 
buildings and providing sanitation services, access to water, and functioning 
toilets.
19
 Before relocating the residents from the buildings designated for 
redevelopment, the City agreed to refurbish several other buildings in inner-
city Johannesburg and to provide essential services at reasonable cost.
20
 
Finally, the City agreed to continue to engage on longer-term solutions to the 
housing crisis.
21
  
The parties returned to the Court seeking not only approval of the specific 
terms of the settlement, but also a decision on the larger issue central to the 
case: whether the City had a plan that complied with Grootboom‘s 
requirements.
22
 While the settlement largely remedied the concerns of 
individual residents, the Grootboom issue was key to whether the litigation 
would have effect beyond these specific individuals. At this point, both sides 
viewed the settlement as important but subsidiary to the plan issue, and many 
expected the Court to use this decision as an opportunity to clarify and 
possibly expand the substantive requirements of section 26 as it had done in a 
very tentative manner in Grootboom.
23
 The City argued that a plan it had 
developed as the litigation progressed was adequate, and the Court should 
 
 
 16. Id. ¶ 1. 
 17. Id. ¶ 3. 
 18. Agreement dated 29 Oct. 2007, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township v. City of 
Johannesburg 2007, Case No. CCT 24/07 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 19. Id. ¶¶ 2–4.  
 20. Id. ¶¶ 5–8. 
 21. Id. ¶ 18. 
 22. See Brian Ray, Extending the Shadow of the Law: Using Hybrid Mechanism to Develop 
Constitutional Norms in Socioeconomic Rights Cases, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 797, 822. 
 23. See id. at 824 (discussing the differences between the Court‘s enforcement approach in 
Grootboom and Olivia Road). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol9/iss3/2
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approve it.
24
 The residents argued that the City failed to consult them or 
others on the plan and that the Court should order further briefing on the 
issue.
25
  
To the surprise of both sides, in its final opinion and order issued several 
weeks later, the Court refused to address the Grootboom issue.
26
 Instead, the 
Court formalized the engagement process that resulted in the settlement in 
this case into a constitutional requirement for all future cases where eviction 
is a possibility. The Court first located engagement within several 
constitutional provisions, including the state‘s obligation to ―encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organizations in local 
government,‖ as well as the rights to human dignity and life.27 The Court 
then described in more specific terms what engagement should entail. 
First, the Court re-emphasized that engagement is part of the broader 
reasonableness requirement it had established in Grootboom and that 
reasonableness may in some situations require ―mak[ing] permanent housing 
available and, in others, . . . provid[ing] no housing at all. The possibilities 
between these extremes are almost endless.‖28 
Second, in most cases, and in particular where a large-scale program is 
involved, engagement cannot be ―ad hoc.‖29 This means that whenever 
government begins a long-term planning process like the City of 
Johannesburg‘s redevelopment project, the entity responsible must build 
engagement into that process from the outset. Long-term engagement of this 
type will require a cadre of ―competent sensitive council workers skilled in 
engagement.‖30 In other words, key bureaucratic and administrative 
structures must incorporate engagement and engagement training. The 
government has an obligation to use those resources to engage well before 
litigation is even a possibility. 
Third, the Court acknowledged the vulnerability of citizens facing 
evictions and their need for skilled representation.
31
 To deal with this power 
imbalance, the Court specifically recognized that civil society groups have a 
constitutional role to play: ―Civil society organizations that support the 
 
 
 24. See Olivia Road, 2008 (5) BCLR 475, ¶¶ 32–34. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. ¶ 16. 
 28. Id. ¶ 18. 
 29. Id. ¶ 19. 
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. ¶ 15. 
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peoples‘ claims should preferably facilitate the engagement process in every 
possible way.‖32 
Finally, the Court required the government to develop and maintain a 
public record of each engagement so that courts could later review not only 
the outcome but also the engagement process.
33
 Emphasizing that ―secrecy is 
counter-productive to the process of engagement,‖ the Court stated ―the 
provision of a complete and accurate account of the process of engagement 
including at least the reasonable efforts of the municipality with that process 
would ordinarily be essential.‖34 Courts are then empowered to review 
―[w]hether there had been meaningful engagement between a city and the 
resident about to be rendered homeless.‖35 The Court emphasized that failure 
to meaningfully engage can by itself—irrespective of the substantive merits 
of the policy requiring eviction—be the basis for a court to deny an eviction 
request: ―The absence of engagement or the unreasonable response of a 
municipality in the engagement process would ordinarily be a weighty 
consideration against the grant of an eviction order.‖36 
Olivia Road represents the high watermark for engagement to date. 
Although real engagement occurred extremely late in the process—literally 
after the parties had left the courthouse—it nonetheless was highly effective 
in obtaining substantial relief with genuine commitment to the remedy from 
both sides. As discussed in Part III, below, the procedural posture of the case, 
in particular the High Court‘s injunction, played an important role in the 
effectiveness of engagement in this case.  
The Court‘s next two attempts at ordering engagement were less 
successful, although the process remains incomplete in one of those cases. 
After describing those two cases, Part III compares and contrasts them with 
the extraordinary success of Olivia Road. It then divides the different 
situations in which engagement can be used into two broad categories and 
offers suggestions for making engagement a more effective remedy in each. 
B. Mamba: A Failed Engagement 
This second case provides an example of the Court extending engagement 
to a new context: closure of refugee camps by the Gauteng government.
37
 
The Court‘s reliance on engagement to deal with a highly charged and urgent 
 
 
 32. Id. ¶ 20. 
 33. Id. ¶ 21. 
 34. Id.  
 35. Id. ¶ 22. 
 36. Id. ¶ 21. 
 37. Mamba, Case No. CCT 22/08, ¶ 2. 
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situation is strong evidence of its commitment to this remedy. But the final 
result—complete refusal by the provincial government to meaningfully 
engage—illustrates the problems with over-reliance on engagement, and 
more specifically the risks of using engagement to deal with a rapidly 
changing situation where the government faces fewer formal constraints and 
has strong incentives to implement its original policy. 
The violent xenophobic protests that began in Johannesburg and extended 
to Durban and Cape Town in May 2008 displaced tens of thousands of 
people in South Africa.
38
 Provincial governments in several areas, including 
Gauteng, which covers Johannesburg, established temporary camps to 
provide security and shelter for victims of the violence.
 
Several NGOs and 
other organizations provided logistical and financial support to the relief 
effort and began working with provincial and local governments on medium- 
and long-term solutions for the camp residents.
39
 
Once the violence subsided, an urgent debate developed over how to deal 
with the refugees that remained in the temporary camps. Advocates for the 
refugees argued that simple closure posed real risks to the refugees and 
would also fail to deal with the systemic issues that gave rise to the 
violence.
40
 Several provincial governments, however, characterized the 
violence as isolated incidents and sought to close the camps soon after the 
attacks subsided.
41
  
The Gauteng government was among the most aggressive in these efforts, 
initially ordering closure of several camps by the end of July 2008 and later 
extending that deadline to August 15, 2008.
42
 Several organizations, led by 
 
 
 38. See, e.g., CORMSA NEWSLETTER (Consortium for Refugees & Migrants in S. Afr. 
[CoRMSA], Johannesburg, S. Afr.), Dec. 19, 2008, at 1 (―As we come to the end of a turbulent year, 
let us reflect on what has been an extremely challenging year for us all. We witnessed the widespread 
violent xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals from January which then culminated in the now 
infamous May attacks.‖), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/ 
CoRMSA-NEWSLETTER-11.pdf. 
 39. See, e.g., Xenophobia Stakeholders Meeting, CORMSA NEWSLETTER (CoRMSA, 
Johannesburg, S. Afr.), May 9, 2008 (―On 17th April, a number of civil society organisations and one 
government department met to discuss further issues relating to the spate of xenophobic attacks that 
have plagued the country.‖), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/ 
CoRMSA-NEWSLETTER-10.pdf. 
 40. See, e.g., Press Release, CoRMSA, CoRMSA Calls for Government to Publish Reintegration 
Plan for Victims of Xenophobic Violence (Aug. 1, 2008), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/ 
press/press-statements/ (follow ―CoRMSA Calls for Government to Publish Reintergration Plans for 
Victims of Xenophobic Violence‖ hyperlink). 
 41. See, e.g., Fundile Majola, „No More Attacks Now, Camps Must Close‟, CAPE ARGUS, Oct. 2, 
2008, http://www.capeargus.co.za/index.php?fSectionId=3571&fArticleId=iol1222952764116R122. 
 42. Press Release, CoRMSA, supra note 40; see also Press Release, CoRMSA, Wits Law Clinic 
and CoRMSA Launch Legal Action against Government to Ensure Sustainable Reintegration Process 
(Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/press/press-statements/ (follow ―Wits Law 
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the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA), an 
umbrella organization that includes several of the organizations active in the 
relief efforts, pressed the government to delay the closures until it developed 
and published a reintegration plan.
43
 When the government ignored their 
request and publicly announced plans to move forward with the closures, 
CoRMSA sued for an injunction to stop the closures.
44
  
After losing at the High Court,
45
 the refugees sought direct access to the 
Constitutional Court even though the Court was in recess.
46
 The Court held 
an emergency hearing on the application the following Monday, August 18, 
2008 and issued an interim order on August 21.
47
 The Order temporarily 
prohibited complete closure of the camps, subject to certain limitations, 
including the right to consolidate shelters and to deport illegal immigrants.
48
 
But it also required, in language nearly identical to the Olivia Road 
engagement order, that the parties  
engage with each other meaningfully and with all other stakeholders 
as soon as it is possible for them to do so in order to resolve the 
differences and difficulties aired in this application in the light of the 
values of the Constitution, the constitutional and statutory obligations 
of the respondents and the rights and duties of the residents of the 
shelters.
49
 
 Paragraph 5 of the Order specified that the engagement should include 
―[o]ther role players,‖ including several NGOs that had provided support to 
the camps.
50
 As in Olivia Road, the Court also required the parties to report 
the results of the engagement to the Court within several weeks.
51
 
The Gauteng government adopted a narrow reading of the Order and 
refused outright to negotiate a reintegration plan with CoRMSA and others. 
Instead, the provincial government read the August 21 Order as requiring 
merely that it keep the refugees and the groups listed in the Order apprised of 
                                                                                                                         
 
Clinic and CoRMSA Launch Legal Action against Government to Ensure Sustainable Reintegration 
Process‖ hyperlink). 
 43. Press Release, CoRMSA, supra note 40. 
 44. Press Release, CoRMSA, supra note 42. 
 45. Mamba v. Minister of Soc. Dev. 2008, Case No. 36573/08 (HC, Pretoria Provincial Div.) (S. 
Afr.). 
 46. No Decision on Refugees‟ Application, INDEPENDENT ONLINE, Aug. 14, 2008, http://www. 
iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=nw20080814091112509C499285. 
 47. Order dated 21 Aug. 2008, Mamba, Case No. CCT 65/08, ¶ 1 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. ¶ 5. 
 51. Id. ¶ 3. 
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its continued plans for closing the camps and moved forward with the closure 
process.
52
  
Following a hearing in September, the Constitutional Court tried to force 
engagement once again, but with little success. The Court issued another 
interim order requiring the government to maintain the camps and continue 
engagement under the guidelines of the August 21 Order.
53
 But the Gauteng 
government persisted in its narrow view of the Court‘s orders and began 
closing the camps without consulting a reintegration plan.
54
 On October 16, 
2008, CoRMSA withdrew the application and the case was dismissed as 
moot.
55
 
Mamba demonstrates that engagement will not always result in the kind 
of successful settlement produced in Olivia Road. The critical questions are 
what made the difference in these two cases and how the procedural posture 
of each case played a significant role. In Olivia Road, the High Court‘s initial 
injunction put a stop to the City‘s eviction process.56 Additionally, while the 
SCA‘s judgment permitted the City to resume evictions, it still placed 
restrictions on that ability and imposed certain costs that required revising the 
original policy. Once the case reached the Constitutional Court, the City was 
already well on its way to instituting a revised policy, and the engagement 
order gave the residents and the groups representing them sufficient leverage 
to force the City to take seriously their views on the policy. 
Mamba presented precisely the opposite situation. The High Court found 
no basis for a challenge to the closures; there was no intermediate appellate 
review and the refugees asked the Constitutional Court to address a fluid 
situation with almost no substantive record.
57
 Under those circumstances, it 
was quite easy for the Gauteng government to treat engagement as nothing 
 
 
 52. Duncan Breen‘s Sept. 2008 Affidavit in Terms of Paragraph 3 of the Court Order dated 21 
Aug. 2008, Mamba, Case No. CCT 65/08, ¶¶ 8, 22, 31–43 (describing the sequence of events 
following the order and concluding: ―In my view one cannot describe [the single meeting the Gauteng 
government attended] as a ‗meaningful engagement‘ as required by the Constitutional Court order.‖).  
 53. See Order dated 16 Sept. 2008, Mamba, Case No. CCT 65/08, ¶ 1 (CC) (S. Afr.) (renewing 
Order dated 21 Aug. 2008 to maintain camps and continue engagement); Press Release, CoRMSA, 
Postponement of Constitutional Court Case Presents Opportunity to Address Concerns of Shelter 
Residents on Reintegration (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/press/press_ 
statements/ (follow ―CoRMSA Postponement of Constitutional Court Case Presents Opportunity to 
Address Concerns of Shelter Residents on Reintegration‖ hyperlink). 
 54. See Refugees Turfed Out of Their Tents, INDEPENDENT ONLINE, Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.iol. 
co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=3069&art_id=nw20081006172807464C184214.  
 55. Press Release, CoRMSA, Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa Withdraws 
Constitutional Court Case; Calls for a Thorough Review of Disaster Management Mechanisms (Oct. 
16, 2008), available at http://www.cormsa.org.za/press/press_statements (follow ―CoRMSA 
Withdraws Constitutional Court Case‖ hyperlink). 
 56. See discussion supra at note 12 and accompanying text. 
 57. See discussion supra at notes 12–17 and accompanying text. 
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more than the equivalent of a formal notification requirement rather than the 
real consultation that the Court plainly expected.  
These differences highlight the political nature of engagement and its 
dependence on sufficient incentives for the political branches to take the 
process seriously. The ambiguity inherent in engagement provides ample 
opportunity for resistance and, without additional political constraints, allows 
the government to fail to take it seriously in many situations without real 
political cost. The Gauteng government‘s narrow reading of what 
engagement requires exemplifies this weakness. 
These differences also suggest that courts must use the remedy in ways 
that both encourage the political branches to take it seriously and also permit 
stronger court intervention where appropriate. I discuss these possibilities in 
Part III, below.  
More broadly, the Mamba result reinforces the need to develop 
engagement as a structured long-term process, rather than relying on it solely 
as an ad hoc remedy during an ongoing case. As the Court emphasized in 
Olivia Road, engagement will work best where it is built into the policy 
development process from the start.
58
 This is the basis for what I call 
―political engagement,‖ developed in Part III.B, below. 
Pushing engagement back into the policy-development process raises 
difficult questions. For example, at what level of government and at what 
point in the process does it make sense to engage, and with whom should the 
authorities engage? In the Court‘s most recent—and as yet incomplete—
engagement effort, Justice Sachs‘ critiques of the failed engagements that led 
to the litigation provide some starting points for answering those questions. 
In Part III.B, I describe those critiques and then, drawing on Charles Epp‘s 
studies of administrative implementation of rights, I offer suggestions for 
how engagement might be developed into more of a political tool rather than 
merely a litigation tactic. 
C. Joe Slovo: Refining Engagement 
The Court‘s most recent decision incorporating engagement involved the 
City of Cape Town‘s major redevelopment project along the N2 Highway, 
the principal north-south corridor leading into Cape Town.
59
 The project 
required the eviction and relocation of over 4,000 families living in an 
informal community known as the Joe Slovo settlement to Delft, an area 
 
 
 58. Olivia Road, 2008 (5) BCLR 475, ¶ 19. 
 59. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847. See also Thubelisha Homes v. Various Occupants (Joe Slovo 
High Ct.) 2008, Case No. 13189/07, ¶ 7 (HC, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Div.) (S. Afr.). 
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much further from the city where many of the residents worked.
60
 This 
project was part of the Breaking New Ground policy—a broader national 
policy developed following Grootboom to redevelop informal settlements 
throughout the country—and was intended to serve as a model for other 
similar projects.
61
  
Many of the residents originally embraced the plan, in part because the 
City and the developer promised that most of them would be entitled to 
return to the new development and acquire new low-cost rental housing.
62
 
But when the first of the three phases of the project was complete, none of 
the houses were allocated to the lowest rental range the residents say they 
were promised.
63
 In addition, phase 2 included no housing for low-income 
residents, only ―bonded housing,‖ i.e., market-rate housing for purchase 
through a mortgage.
64
  
Upset at what they called the ―broken promises‖ of the first two phases, 
the residents began to organize both formal and informal protests against the 
development.
65
 The local, regional, and national governments, along with the 
developer, Thubelisha Homes, brought an emergency application in the Cape 
High Court seeking an injunction ordering the eviction of the residents under 
the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19 of 1998, known as ―PIE.‖66 
The High Court issued a decision permitting the relocations to proceed 
and denying the residents relief shortly after the Constitutional Court issued 
its opinion in Olivia Road.
67
 The judge made passing reference to the 
engagement requirement and, in a parenthetical aside, found that the 
numerous meetings the City Council held with residents ―along with multiple 
averments in the court papers of meetings and/or consultations that were held 
with residents of Joe Slovo indicates that there was a sufficient amount of 
engagements . . . regarding this matter.‖68  
The residents appealed directly to the Constitutional Court.
69
 Several of 
the same groups that were active in organizing the residents in Olivia Road 
 
 
 60. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, ¶ 125 (Moseneke, DCJ.). 
 61. Id. ¶ 24 (Yacoob, J.); id. ¶ 327 (Sachs, J.). 
 62. Id. ¶ 327 (Sachs, J.); id. ¶¶ 31–33 (Yacoob, J.). 
 63. Id. ¶¶ 31–34 (Sachs, J.). 
 64. Id. ¶ 32 (Yacoob, J.); id. ¶ 371 (Sachs, J.). 
 65. Id. ¶ 34 (Yacoob, J.); id. ¶¶ 327, 376–378 (Sachs, J.). 
 66. Id. ¶ 15 (Yacoob, J.). 
 67. Joe Slovo High Ct., Case No. 13189/07. 
 68. Id. ¶ 24. 
 69. See Pearlie Joubert, „It‟s Our Duty Not to Be Silent‟, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE, Aug. 24, 
2008 (―In a surprise move, the Constitutional Court gave the community permission to challenge the 
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submitted amicus curiae briefs to the Constitutional Court in which they 
argued specifically that the City of Cape Town failed to adequately engage 
with the residents.
70
 The Court granted those groups permission to present 
this issue at oral argument.
71
 During the hearing, the Deputy Chief Justice 
Dikgang Moseneke, in a move reminiscent of Olivia Road‘s interim order, 
suggested the amici were correct by ―interven[ing] to suggest that the parties 
talk to each other and advise the court on a ‗just and equitable‘ solution.‖72  
Unlike in Olivia Road, however, this last-ditch effort at resolving the 
issues through negotiation failed, and the Court issued its decision in June, 
2009.
73
 The decision consists of five different opinions spanning 221 pages. 
All five opinions agree that neither section 26 nor the PIE protects the 
residents from eviction, and all five also concur in the final order that 
prescribes a structured eviction process requiring engagement with the 
residents to determine most of the significant details for eviction and 
relocation.
74
 
Early reaction has been generally critical of the Court‘s refusal to find in 
favor of the residents. Sandra Liebenberg describes the result as ―the largest 
judicially sanctioned eviction of a community in [South Africa‘s] post-
apartheid period.‖75 Pierre de Vos, while acknowledging in his blog that ―the 
judgment shows a genuine concern for the plight of the Joe Slovo residents,‖ 
criticizes the substantive holdings as failing to expect ―the state to act in an 
honest manner and to cater also for the most vulnerable and poor members of 
a well-established community whose area is to be upgraded.‖76 
From the perspective of the success of the engagement remedy, Joe Slovo 
represents a mixed result. It is clear that at least some members of the Court 
hoped that engagement would work as it did in Olivia Road, relieving them 
of the responsibility for deciding the difficult substantive issues presented in 
the case; Justice Moseneke‘s reported remarks are evidence of that.77 Justice 
                                                                                                                         
 
ruling and approach it without going through the Supreme Court of Appeal.‖), http://www.mg.co.za/ 
printformat/single/2008-08-24-its-our-duty-not-to-be-silent. 
 70. See id. (noting that ―[t]he community law centre of the University of the Western Cape and 
the Centre on Housing Rights for Evictions were admitted as friends of the court, in support of the 
resident‘s [sic] right to be properly consulted before being evicted.‖). 
 71. See Further Directions dated 15 Aug. 2008, Joe Slovo, Case No. CCT 22/08 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 72. Joubert, supra note 69. 
 73. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847. 
 74. Id. ¶¶ 4–5 (Yacoob, J.). 
 75. Liebenberg, supra note 7. 
 76. Constitutionally Speaking, http://constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/joe-slovo-case-the-good-the-
bad-and-the-mostly-unstated/ (June 14, 2009). 
 77. See supra text accompanying note 72.  
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Sachs also mentioned these efforts in passing, and participants in the case 
confirm that the Court urged the parties to engage following oral argument.
78
  
But the residents of Joe Slovo were in a different position than those in 
Olivia Road and had good reasons to resist further engagement. First, as 
Justice Sachs pointed out, the government‘s attempts at engagement up to 
that point were characterized by ―frequent employment of a top-down 
approach where the purpose of reporting back to the community was seen as 
being to pass on information about decisions already taken rather than to 
involve the residents as partners in the process of decision-making itself.‖79 
This, combined with their sense that the government had deceived them 
about the terms of the project, hardened the residents‘ position over time and 
left them less willing to trust either that the government would negotiate 
seriously or would fulfill whatever commitment resulted from the 
negotiations.
80
 
More importantly, unlike the Olivia Road squatters, most of whom had no 
significant attachment to the specific buildings in which they were living, the 
Joe Slovo residents were part of a long-standing community that would be 
significantly disrupted even if the government honored the commitment to 
permit seventy percent of the residents to return to the new development. 
One critical issue in the case was whether the PIE even applied to these 
residents because the City had granted them implicit consent to reside there 
over the long course of the community‘s development.81 If the City had 
granted such consent, then the eviction procedures under PIE would not 
apply. The residents felt strongly that they deserved a definitive court ruling 
on that specific legal question before they should be forced to negotiate with 
the government over the terms of the redevelopment and relocation.
82
 
In the end, the Court was forced to decide that issue without the benefit of 
an agreement by the parties. It did, however, make engagement a centerpiece 
of the eviction process that it ordered in the case, and, by doing so, 
strengthened the residents‘ bargaining position significantly. Liebenberg 
emphasizes that the Court was ―[n]ot content to rely on vague guarantees 
regarding the nature of the alternative accommodation to be provided at 
Delft,‖ and instead ―stipulated detailed standards with which the ‗temporary 
accommodation units‘ in Delft had to comply, including the provision of 
 
 
 78. See Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, ¶ 399 (Sachs, J.) (noting that ―after extensive argument 
at the hearing, the Court invited the parties to attempt to reach an agreed solution‖).  
 79. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, ¶ 378 (Sachs, J.). 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. ¶¶ 356–358. 
 82. Interview with Sandra J. Liebenberg, Professor of Law, Stellenbosch University, in 
Stellenbosch, S. Afr. (Mar. 5, 2009). 
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services and facilities.‖83 The Court also ordered the government to honor its 
commitment to allocate seventy percent of low-cost housing at Joe Slovo to 
the relocated communities.
84
 
With that background of settled terms in place, the Court then ordered the 
government to engage with the residents on the specifics of relocation and 
included a detailed agenda of the items on which the residents must be 
consulted. These include specifics such as ―the exact time, manner and 
conditions‖ of each relocation and ―[t]he precise temporary residential 
accommodation units‖ allocated to each resident.85 The Court also retained 
jurisdiction over the case requiring the parties to report the results of these 
engagements and also granting explicit permission for any party to seek relief 
directly from the Court ―[s]hould this order not be complied with by any 
party, or should the order give rise to unforeseen difficulties . . . .‖86 
De Vos argues that the detailed engagement order, in particular the range 
of issues on which the government is required to consult, combined with the 
Court‘s retention of jurisdiction, may be a back-door mechanism for forcing 
the government to engage with the residents over a revised plan. This would 
create the policy-development engagement that the government failed to 
conduct prior to the eviction.
87
 Liebenberg is less convinced that the decision 
is a positive one for the residents and has criticized the Court for its 
―willingness to effectively condone the inadequate consultation processes‖ in 
the case.
88
 Nonetheless, she approves of the greater control the Court is 
exercising over the engagement process.
89
 Both observations show that, 
regardless of one‘s view of the Court‘s decisions on the substantive legal 
issues, the engagement order in the case represents an important development 
of the remedy and its use in a new context. As I discuss in the following 
sections, the innovations the Court introduced in this order, in particular a 
more specific agenda and stronger oversight, represent important refinements 
that can make the remedy more effective over time. 
III. TOWARDS POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT 
The varying degrees of success of the engagement processes in these 
three cases point toward both the limits of engagement and engagement‘s 
 
 
 83. Liebenberg, supra note 7. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, ¶ 7 (terms 11.2–11.3). 
 86. Id. ¶ 7 (term 21). 
 87. Constitutionally Speaking, supra note 76. 
 88. Liebenberg, supra note 7. 
 89. Id. 
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potential as an innovative remedy. In the following sections I divide 
engagement into two categories: litigation engagement—the form that it has 
taken in the three cases described above—and political engagement—the 
form that I think the Court hopes will develop and that has the greatest 
potential for transforming engagement into an effective tool for 
socioeconomic rights enforcement. 
A. Litigation Engagement 
Two of the three cases discussed above, Olivia Road and Mamba, 
illustrate engagement operating during the course of litigation, what I call 
―litigation engagement.‖ Joe Slovo provides a slightly different variation: 
engagement as a remedy-management device in litigation. I group all three 
together despite this difference because a comparison of the circumstances of 
each case and the roles the Court played in the engagement process provides 
a basis for improving the effectiveness of this remedy in other litigation 
contexts. 
In Olivia Road engagement worked extraordinarily well; in Mamba it 
failed completely. Why the difference? Several points are immediately 
apparent. First, the engagement in Olivia Road was ordered after the 
government was already committed to changing the challenged policy, in 
part because of the injunction issued by the High Court. Second, the litigation 
was far advanced, and both sides had already been negotiating as part of that 
litigation for an extended time and understood the positions and arguments of 
the other side. Third, the parties had the benefit of two lower court orders, 
one of which favored the residents and the other the government. 
The Mamba situation was quite different. The Gauteng government was 
firmly committed to closure and had already moved forward with 
implementing that policy. The refugees were forced to bring an emergency 
application, and the only lower court review resulted in a cursory two-page 
order that did not seriously address the issues raised. Finally, the engagement 
order was sufficiently ambiguous that the government could interpret it 
conservatively. 
These differences suggest several elements that are important for 
litigation engagements to succeed. First, courts must view engagement as an 
iterative process and actively manage that process. Where the parties fail to 
reach agreement, the public-reporting requirement will create a record that 
the court can assess for both substantive progress on the issues and also party 
compliance with the obligation to engage meaningfully. The court can then 
decide—as happened in Mamba—whether further engagement is likely to 
resolve any of the outstanding issues. The court can also consider changing 
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the terms of the engagement. The range of options is limitless but might 
include, for example, appointing a mediator or ordering the inclusion (or 
even removal) of interested groups from the process. 
The engagement order in Joe Slovo offers some useful examples of the 
kind of control a court might exercise over the process in a litigation 
engagement to improve the prospects for success. The order included an 
agenda for the engagement that specified seven issues for discussion.
90
 
Among other things, the parties were required to decide ―[t]he exact time, 
manner and conditions [of relocation]‖ and ―[t]he precise temporary 
residential accommodation units‖ for relocation.91 While it would not be 
possible for a court in a litigation engagement where the primary issues like 
whether relocation will occur to structure the engagement agenda with the 
same degree of specificity as in Joe Slovo, it is easy to imagine a court 
controlling the engagement agenda in a similar fashion by listing the issues 
the parties must address and then requiring them to report back on each. 
The court may also determine that some issues are not susceptible to 
further engagement and that definitive resolution of them would enhance the 
prospect for resolution of other issues in the case through engagement. For 
example, in Mamba, the Court could have held that closure of the camps 
required a reintegration plan but ordered engagement to determine the details 
of such a plan. Doing so would have prevented closure before engagement 
and created the kind of pressure to change policy that the High Court 
injunction did in Olivia Road. 
Joe Slovo again provides some examples of this sort of increased court 
control. As Liebenberg notes, the Court was unwilling to trust the 
government with the details of the relocation to Delft and therefore 
established specific terms in the order while using engagement to determine 
other details.
92
 This kind of partial determination of the substantive issues 
can break a logjam in negotiations and also alter the bargaining positions of 
the parties.  
Combining engagement with partial determination of substantive legal 
issues also answers the concern raised by the residents in Joe Slovo, that 
parties sometimes have the right to a definitive court judgment on a 
controlling issue in the case. Taken as a whole, the Joe Slovo decision is 
really an example of the court using engagement to give back control to 
parties over policy details after deciding the substantive issues. 
 
 
 90. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, ¶ 7 (terms 11.1–11.7). 
 91. Id. ¶ 7 (terms 11.2–11.3). 
 92. Liebenberg, supra note 7. 
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Taking this more active role will be particularly important where, as in 
Mamba, the government is firmly committed to the challenged policy. In a 
less fluid situation, it is also possible for a court to signal the parties during 
the hearing on its preliminary assessment on the merits of a particular issue 
without definitively resolving the issue before ordering further engagement. 
This can have a similar effect in altering the bargaining position of each side 
while still leaving the broadest range of options open for engagement. 
Second, courts must be willing to impose sanctions on parties who fail to 
meaningfully engage. In Mamba, the Court should have retained more direct 
control after ordering engagement to ensure compliance with the process. 
Although plainly correct when considering the plight of the refugees‘ 
involved in the case, the refugees‘ decision not to persist with the appeal 
eliminated the possibility for the Court to impose sanctions on the 
government for its failure to meaningfully engage. For litigation 
engagements to succeed, courts must be willing to impose sanctions for 
procedural failures like the one in Mamba. The Court recognized this in 
Olivia Road when it required a record of engagement efforts by 
municipalities and emphasized that ―[t]he absence of any engagement or the 
unreasonable response of a municipality in the engagement process would 
ordinarily be a weighty consideration against the grant of an ejectment 
order.‖93 
The result in Olivia Road demonstrates that this kind of repeated 
engagement with active court management and the possibility of sanctions 
for failing to engage can make the process more effective. The Constitutional 
Court recognized this in the judgment noting that ―[t]he deciding factor in 
this case . . . was that engagement was ordered by this Court, and the parties 
had been asked to report back on the process while proceedings were 
pending before it.‖94  
This iterative process also puts courts in a better position to make 
substantive policy decisions where engagement fails. The public record 
created through these engagements will give the court the benefit of detailed 
proposals and justifications from each side and also an account of how 
positions changed during the course of the engagement.
95
 In addition, once 
this process has developed over time, courts will also have the benefit of 
 
 
 93. Olivia Road, 2008 (5) BCLR 475, ¶ 21. 
 94. Id. ¶ 30. 
 95. Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1439 
(1991) (In the case of court-imposed remedies following deliberation, ―[t]he court‘s remedial decision 
. . . will be informed by the data, diversity of perspective, and reasoning produced by the 
deliberations.‖). 
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records of other engagements and can consider the similarities and 
differences of this particular situation. 
Finally, when ordering engagement in the context of an ongoing dispute 
courts, at least in the short term, should be more willing to enjoin the 
challenged activity and retain supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the process 
works. This is exactly what the court did in Joe Slovo,
96
 and, although the 
results of that increased control are not yet clear, it is plausible that the Court 
took these steps in recognition that the result in Mamba was likely due in part 
to the lack of more direct court management.
97
 These examples of increased 
agenda control, more direct management, and an increased willingness to 
impose sanctions all represent potentially important innovations in the 
engagement process. They should send a message to lower courts that they 
must do more than merely reflexively order engagement, and instead 
carefully consider how to structure the process in each case. 
Increasing court control over the process, imposing sanctions for failure 
to engage, and a willingness to order temporary injunctions during 
engagement should all enhance the effectiveness of the remedy but come at 
the cost of diminishing the flexibility of the process. The characteristics just 
described will turn what at this point looks like a novel innovation into 
something much more like the standard role courts have taken for decades in 
the U.S. in large structural reform cases.
98
 
Mark Tushnet has described the kind of litigation engagement represented 
by Olivia Road and Mamba—a court-ordered and structured negotiation 
among affected parties—as a type of ―weak-form‖ review.99 Weak-form 
review has the advantage of making judicial review more democratic by 
incorporating the views of the political branches in the interpretation of 
constitutional rights.
100
 Remedies like engagement rely on the political 
branches and citizens themselves, not courts, to develop the terms of the 
remedy. This transforms the process of constitutional enforcement into 
something that looks more like a political than a judicial process while still 
retaining a role for courts ensuring that constitutional values are enforced. 
 
 
 96. See discussion supra notes 80–93 and accompanying text. 
 97. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, ¶¶ 16, 21. 
 98. See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS 
WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 223–28 (2003) (describing and critiquing judicial management of 
public institutions). 
 99. See MARK V. TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 248 (2008) (―[A]nother characteristic [of 
weak-form review] might be judicial encouragement of negotiations among affected parties over the 
contours of a more detailed plan, which the courts might ratify rather than develop independently.‖). 
 100. Id. at 228; id. at 264 (―[W]eak-form judicial review respects the right, grounded in 
democratic theory, for majorities to prevail . . . .‖). 
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To retain these benefits of engagement in a litigation setting while still 
assuming sufficient control to make the remedy work, courts must strike a 
balance as they manage the process and decide how much control to assume 
at each point. The flexibility inherent in engagement will allow each judge to 
adjust the level of control they assume at different points in the case; the 
possibility of repeated engagements offers opportunities to refine the process 
both within each case and across cases over time. 
In spite of this flexibility, it is likely that litigation engagements will turn 
out to be the least interesting and probably least important form of 
engagement. Under the right circumstances and with careful and creative 
management of the process, successes like Olivia Road are possible, but once 
litigation starts, often it will be difficult for courts to create the right mix of 
incentives for the parties to reach the kind of agreement that resulted from the 
Olivia Road engagement.  
Litigation engagements also run the greatest risk of depriving the parties 
of their right to have a court decide important legal issues. This concern was 
raised directly by several advocates involved in the Joe Slovo case.
101
 
Perhaps more importantly, the ultimate result in Joe Slovo, like the 
Mamba decision, highlights the risk in relying exclusively on this kind of 
indirect remedy without ever developing the substantive requirements of 
section 26 directly. Mark Tushnet, citing Cass Sunstein‘s discussion of 
constitutional development in post-Soviet countries, argues that ―[c]oupling 
strong rights with weak remedies, particularly when those remedies are rarely 
deployed . . . may be a formula for producing cynicism about the 
constitution.‖102 Each of these cases was viewed by many as an important 
opportunity for the Court to develop the substantive requirements of section 
26. The success of engagement in Olivia Road showed that engagement 
might succeed in getting parties and the political branches to do this 
themselves. But the critical reaction to the Court‘s approval of the evictions 
in Joe Slovo and the patent failure of engagement in Mamba show that 
engagement‘s success will depend on the Court occasionally making 
substantive determinations about what section 26 and these other rights 
require.  
B. Political Engagement 
In Olivia Road the Court emphasized that, to work effectively, 
―engagement [should ordinarily] take place before litigation commences 
 
 
 101. Interview with Sandra J. Liebenberg, supra note 82. 
 102. TUSHNET, supra note 99, at 252. 
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unless it is not possible, or reasonable to do so because of urgency or some 
other compelling reason.‖103 I call this form of engagement ―political 
engagement.‖ Extending engagement beyond a litigation aspect and turning 
it into an administrative requirement offers the greatest potential for making 
the remedy a meaningful tool for implementing section 26 and other 
socioeconomic rights.  
Although the Court first called for political engagement in Olivia Road, 
beyond the broad outlines described above, it did not detail what this kind of 
engagement should look like. At several points in his opinion in Joe Slovo, 
Justice Sachs began describing some of the features of political engagement 
that provide starting points for articulating the requirements for this use of 
engagement. First, Sachs praised the commitment in the Breaking New 
Ground Policy (―BNG‖) to ―a reinvigorated contract with the people and 
partner organisations for the achievement of sustainable human settlements‖ 
but then went on to criticize the authorities‘ failure to implement that 
commitment by involving citizens in the planning process.
104
  
In a footnote, Sachs explained that political engagement must always 
include affected citizens as genuine partners, not mere recipients of state aid. 
Sachs warned that the BNG‘s emphasis on ―mobilizing‖ communities ―risks 
treating the communities as recipients of state largesse to be informed of the 
benefits they are about to receive, rather then [sic] as active partners engaged 
with the authorities in developing programmes and finding solutions . . . .‖105 
Sachs went on to identify several specific problems with the engagements 
that did occur as the development process progressed. First, he noted the lack 
of a clear chain of command among the different governmental entities 
involved: ―There were simply too many rather than too few protagonists on 
the side of the authorities. At different stages the occupants had to engage 
with national and then with provincial and finally with local entities.‖106 
Second, he cited the shifting and, at times competing, policy objectives of the 
different players that confused the residents and led to their sense that the 
government had broken its promises about the availability of low-cost 
housing.
107
 
Finally, Sachs emphasized the backstop role of the courts in ensuring that 
political engagements live up to the requirements of the Constitution and 
implementing legislation, like the PIE. Sachs described section 26 and the 
 
 
 103. Olivia Road, 2008 (5) BCLR 475, ¶ 30. 
 104. Joe Slovo, 2009 (9) BCLR 847, ¶ 378 (Sachs, J.). 
 105. Id. ¶ 117 n.49 (Sachs, J.). 
 106. Id. ¶ 379 (Sachs, J.). 
 107. Id. 
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PIE as providing a ―safety net‖ because ―[u]ltimately, no resident could be 
compelled to leave Joe Slovo except in terms of a court order . . . .‖108 Sachs 
later emphasized that the court‘s role in reviewing the process was not 
limited to administrative review; instead, a court ―would be hearing the 
matter de novo (from scratch), and making up its own mind whether the 
justice and equity requirements of PIE had been met.‖109 This would involve 
―consider[ing] all relevant circumstances, and giv[ing] a full hearing to the 
occupiers.‖110 
Joe Slovo confirms the somewhat ambiguous message in Olivia Road that 
the Court expects government at all levels to build engagement into the 
policy development process. Together these cases establish the broad 
contours of political engagement. Affected citizens must be treated as 
partners, not aid recipients; authorities must consult with relevant civil 
society organizations, who, in turn are to act as facilitators of this process.  
Political engagement also requires considerable coordination and 
administrative planning by the government. Some form of employee training 
program for engagement is necessary. Where multiple governmental entities 
are involved, they must coordinate with each other in the engagement. 
Finally, authorities must establish a system for creating and preserving a 
record of each engagement.  
Courts themselves must also develop procedures for evaluating the 
engagement process for compliance with these requirements. And, when an 
engagement fails and the parties resort to litigation, courts must be prepared 
to enforce the engagement requirements through sanctions. 
These broad contours firmly establish that political engagement is now a 
constitutional requirement and give citizens and civil society groups 
important leverage to demand a role in policy development, but they leave 
open many difficult questions about what such engagements would look like. 
For example, following Mamba, is the Gauteng government required now to 
engage with the same NGO‘s on emergency plans for responses to potential 
future crises? Should the refugees who remain in South Africa have a voice? 
If another municipality, like Durban, decides to begin a similar 
redevelopment plan, with whom must it engage and at what point in the 
policy-planning process? 
The three engagement cases the Court has decided leave these questions 
open. But these decisions point to two important features of engagement that 
may begin to answer these questions. First, engagement is more than an ad 
 
 
 108. Id. ¶ 382 (Sachs, J.). 
 109. Id. ¶ 393 (Sachs, J.). 
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hoc alternative dispute resolution mechanism limited to a particular case; 
engagement imposes long-term systematic obligations on the state. The 
contours of those obligations will be developed over time as municipalities 
and other levels of government conduct more engagements and begin to 
build the engagement infrastructure I discuss below.
111
  
Second, NGOs, public-interest lawyers, and others have a constitutional 
role to play in developing the responsibilities that engagement imposes on 
the state. These cases open the door for groups active on socioeconomic 
rights issues to argue for a more direct role earlier in the development of 
policies that implicate these rights. Past experience demonstrates that 
pressure from these groups is necessary for developing political enforcement 
mechanisms,
112
 and the Court‘s engagement decisions should increase the 
leverage of these groups because authorities know they are now required to 
consult them when developing socioeconomic policy or risk sanction by the 
courts. 
Up to this point, engagement has developed principally as part of 
litigation. Interviews with at least one of the advocates who represented key 
organizations indicate that, following Olivia Road, engagement is often 
viewed as a tactic for delaying evictions.
113
 A standard argument deployed in 
many eviction cases is that the entity seeking eviction has failed to 
meaningfully engage as required by Olivia Road and PIE before attempting 
to evict.
114
 This use of engagement creates some prospect for actual 
resolution if and when a court actually orders the parties to engage. But it is 
simply a standardized version of the litigation engagements described above 
and, while offering the benefits of that form of engagement, does not realize 
the full potential of this innovation.  
Charles Epp‘s work on the development of what he calls ―administrative-
rights policies‖ in the U.S. is useful for considering how engagement could 
develop beyond a litigation tactic and into an effective tool for political 
enforcement of socioeconomic rights. Epp argues, ―[i]n the modern state, 
rights are empty promises in many contexts unless they are given life in 
 
 
 111. For a discussion of the potential for individual engagements to serve as precedents for the 
procedural requirements of engagement see Ray, supra note 22. 
 112. Mark Heywood‘s description of the Treatment Action Campaign‘s multi-pronged efforts, 
which included not only legal action, but also political and public advocacy campaigns to change the 
government‘s HIV/AIDs policies, is the best example of this. See Mark Heywood, Preventing Mother-
to-Child HIV Transmission in South Africa: Background, Strategies and Outcomes of the Treatment 
Action Campaign Case Against the Minister of Health, 19 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 278 (2003). 
 113. Interview with Adrian Friedman, Advocate for the Legal Resources Centre, in Johannesburg, 
S. Afr. (Mar. 3, 2009). 
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administrative policies and practices.‖115 He has documented a shift in a 
range of areas in which ―U.S. administrative governance became 
significantly, even dramatically more rights-focused; the rights policies at the 
heart of the change became institutionalized and integrated into government 
agencies in substantial administrative depth.‖116 
Epp describes the ―dominant theoretical explanation of administrative-
rights policies [as one] that views the policies as the expression of 
institutional models developed in the face of ambiguous threats from the 
legal environment, particularly threats of legal liability.‖117 He argues that 
this model is incomplete, however. Drawing on the work of Mark Galanter 
and his own empirical studies of the perceptions about litigation of key 
administrators, Epp argues that in order for those threats to result in 
administrative change, they must be supported by the kind of resources, 
organization, and long-term planning that Galanter argues have permitted the 
―haves‖ to succeed in influencing administrative policy over time.118 Epp 
argues that ―have-nots‖ can succeed in institutionalizing rights-policies at the 
administrative level in the same way as the ―haves,‖ provided that they 
acquire resources and develop similar, long-term strategies ―aimed at 
‗playing for the rules,‘ rather than aiming only for short-term success in the 
case at hand.‖119 
In addition, however, Epp notes that litigation itself is merely a catalyst 
for the more influential process of developing ―forward-looking, defensive 
policies and actions‖ to minimize these threats.120 This has three dimensions. 
First, these policies typically involve increased attention to the legal 
dimensions of policies represented by the addition of lawyers or legal experts 
in policy discussions.
121
 Second, they result in what Epp calls the 
―systematization of procedures.‖122 This includes procedures for identifying 
and remedying potential violations and also procedures for consistently 
investigating and resolving claims that actually arise.
123
 Third, this forward-
looking response involves increased training regarding the legal 
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responsibilities of each employee.
124
 Epp captures all three dimensions and 
their relationship to the threat of litigation in a quote from one administrator: 
―‗Responding to the whole litigation area is like a comprehensive program: 
you need a comprehensive policy that covers everything, from getting good 
legal advice, to planning for known risks, to training employees, to insurance 
coverage, to being responsive to citizens‘ complaints.‘‖125 
What I have called political engagement is actually a process that the 
Court hopes will result in the kind of administrative reform described by 
Epp. Recognizing the limitations of any single judgment in achieving 
systematic change, as well as the practical problems inherent in court control 
over complicated policies and programs, the Court developed engagement as 
a mechanism for making socioeconomic rights enforcement a principally 
political, rather than legal, effort.
126
 Epp‘s work suggests that the Court‘s 
focus on administrative enforcement is appropriate and could result in a 
genuine shift toward rights-sensitive policies.  
Several aspects of the remedy also reflect Epp‘s emphasis on the need for 
the pressure by organized interest groups backed by the threat of legal 
sanctions to generate change at the administrative level. First, the Court‘s 
requirement in Olivia Road that authorities must include civil society 
organizations in the engagement process recognizes the key role that repeat 
players can play in the policy development. After Olivia Road, these groups 
now have a constitutionally sanctioned role to play that should give them 
leverage to insist on consultation relatively early in planning processes. 
These advocacy groups will have broader perspectives and will understand 
how the results of these individual negotiations may affect the broader policy 
landscape. More importantly, these groups have the resources and staying 
power to ―play for rules‖ as Epp emphasizes is key to having an effect on 
policy.
127
 Epp notes in his interviews that ―[r]espondents universally 
recognized the significance of the relative organizational ‗staying power‘ (as 
one put it) of a litigant or potential litigant.‖128 
Second, the engagement requirement itself is designed as a process for 
creating this legal pressure by organized interest groups. In addition to giving 
these groups a seat at the policy table, by requiring authorities to engage in a 
systematic manner during any long-term planning process, the Court has 
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created a procedural requirement for forcing government to pay attention to 
rights claims outside of litigation. When starting any planning process, 
authorities must now incorporate engagement into that process and consider 
the likely claims that affected citizens and their representatives might raise. 
The Court‘s threat that a failure to engage meaningfully in the process may 
itself be sufficient for a court to deny a government‘s request to enforce a 
policy—even where the policy itself is otherwise unobjectionable—is a 
powerful incentive for authorities to take those claims seriously. The public-
reporting requirement reinforces that threat by creating a record that a court 
can review for procedural compliance.  
The Court‘s requirement that government must treat engagement as a 
systematic requirement should result in the creation of standardized 
processes that Epp identified as key to the development of administrative-
rights policies in the U.S.
129
 Following these three cases, authorities must 
develop structured, long-term approaches to engagement and build plans for 
engagement from the start of any redevelopment process. This forces those 
municipalities to pay consistent attention to the requirements of section 26 
and establish processes for identifying and resolving potential violations 
ahead of time as well as for dealing with citizen claims in the engagement 
itself.  
Thus far I have described engagement‘s effects on government as 
primarily defensive. But the systematization that Epp describes also has 
potential benefits for government by giving authorities control over when to 
engage and under what circumstances. As I have explained elsewhere, the 
Olivia Road situation presents a useful example of this effect.
130
 If the City 
takes seriously the obligations the Court has described, it should now 
incorporate a structured engagement review process into the inner-city 
redevelopment plan. This plan will force the City to decide whether a 
particular building or set of buildings requires redevelopment and to assess 
the potential cost of engaging with the residents in light of the benefits it was 
required to provide the residents in Olivia Road. This permits the City to take 
control over what interventions to make in light of its overall budget and 
policy priorities. 
Finally, the Court has explicitly called for government to begin 
incorporating the training processes that Epp identified as having the most 
significant effect in developing administrative-rights policies.
131
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Transforming engagement into a political tool, however, will require 
creative and persistent effort by the groups who have built the foundations 
for it through litigation in these and other cases. As Epp emphasizes, changes 
at the administrative level require substantial resources and ―staying power‖ 
to become repeat players that capture the attention of policymakers 
throughout the administrative apparatus.
132
 
The Court‘s engagement decisions provide three important aids to that 
effort. First, they acknowledge a constitutional role for civil society 
organizations that those organizations can use to work for recognition outside 
of litigation and earlier in the policy-development process.  
Second, the Court has emphasized that government is constitutionally 
required to develop administrative structures for engagement. These are 
precisely the type of administrative changes Epp attributes to the 
development of administrative-rights policies.
133
 Civil society organizations 
should use their constitutionally sanctioned role to advocate not only for 
specific policy changes but also for these types of generic administrative-
system changes—things such as engagement training for employees and the 
creation of something like an engagement department in key executive-
branch agencies.  
Finally, these groups should continue to use litigation as a mechanism for 
developing the political side of engagement, but with increased attention to 
the need for the structural changes just described. For example, in the next 
major eviction case, it makes sense to argue not only that the authorities have 
failed to engage the residents they seek to evict, but also that this specific 
failure is the result of a broader lack of compliance with the Court‘s orders in 
Olivia Road and Joe Slovo. The court could then order engagement both on 
the specific issues in the case and the administrative changes necessary to 
provide for meaningful engagement in future cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Despite their ubiquity in modern constitutions, socioeconomic rights raise 
significant institutional competence and separation of powers concerns that 
make judicial enforcement a challenging task.
134
 Courts both are ill-equipped 
to deal with the complex policy issues raised by these rights and lack the 
democratic legitimacy of the political branches when making the inevitable 
tradeoffs among competing priorities required when setting socioeconomic 
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policy. The South African Constitutional Court has taken a different 
approach and in doing so has led the way in developing innovative remedies 
that both recognize the challenges inherent in enforcing socioeconomic rights 
while still preserving the ability of courts to play a role in ensuring that these 
rights are not merely empty promises. 
Despite its record of innovation, the critics of the Court charge it with 
―proceduralizing‖ these rights; demoting them to a kind of lower-class status 
among rights, deserving only of a limited review for administrative 
reasonableness rather than full-blown judicial enforcement.
135
 These critics 
correctly note that—with a few relatively small exceptions—the Court has 
consistently refused to intervene in substantive policy when enforcing 
rights.
136
 
Engagement is the Court‘s latest—and perhaps most promising—
innovation in this area. If it remains merely a litigation tool, engagement still 
offers substantial benefits over traditional litigation but likely will not 
provide a real answer to the Court‘s critics. But, if civil society groups, 
NGOs, and public interest law firms take up the opportunity that the Court 
has created by using engagement as a judicially enforceable tool and demand 
a voice and a role in policy development, engagement holds real promise as 
an effective mechanism for enforcing these rights. 
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